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Abstract—Several projects propose an information-centric ap-
proach to the network of the future. Such an approach makes
efficient content distribution possible by making information
retrieval host-independent and integrating into the network
storage for caching information. Requests for particular content
can, thus, be satisfied by any host or server holding a copy.
The current security model based on host authentication is
not applicable in this context. Basic security functionality must
instead be attached directly to the data and its naming scheme.
A naming scheme to name content and other objects that enables
verification of data integrity as well as owner authentication
and identification is here presented. The naming scheme is
designed for flexibility and extensibility, e.g., to integrate other
security properties like access control. At the same time, the
naming scheme offers persistent IDs even though the content,
content owner and/or owner’s organizational structure, or lo-
cation change. The requirements for the naming scheme and
an analysis showing how the proposed scheme fulfills them are
presented. Experience with prototyping the naming scheme is
also discussed. The naming scheme builds the foundation for a
secure information-centric network infrastructure that can also
solve some of the main security problems of today’s Internet.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several research projects, past and current, e.g., Data-
oriented Network Architecture (DONA) [1], Network of
Information (NetInf) [2], Publish-Subscribe Internet Rout-
ing Paradigm (PSIRP) [3], and Content-Centric Networking
(CCN) [4] investigate new network architectures based on an
information-centric paradigm. In this paradigm, storage for
caching information is part of the basic network infrastructure.
The network service is defined in terms of Information Objects
(IOs) themselves, for example, Web pages, photos, movies,
or text documents. The application programming interface
has the style of publish/subscribe, where originators publish
IOs and receivers subscribe to IOs without the two parties
needing to know about each other. Any host or server in
the network holding a copy of an IO can thus deliver it
to a requesting client. This paradigm thus enables improved
content distribution, which appears to be the prevailing usage
of the current Internet.
Security in an information-centric network needs to be
implemented differently than in current, host-centric networks.
In the latter, most security mechanisms are based on host au-
thentication and then trusting the data that the host delivers. In
an information-centric network, host authentication cannot be
relied upon, or one of the main advantages of an information-
centric network, i.e., benefiting from any available copy, is
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defeated. Host authentication of a random, untrusted host that
happens to have a copy does not establish the needed trust.
Instead, the security has to be directly attached to the IOs
which can be done via the scheme used to name them.
In this paper, we propose the NetInf naming scheme. It
builds the foundation for an information-centric security model
that integrates security deeply into the network architecture. In
this model, trust is based on the information itself. Building
on an identifier/locator split, each IO is given a unique
identifier (ID) with cryptographic properties. Together with
additional metadata, the ID can be used to verify data integrity
and several other security properties. In comparison with the
security model in today’s host-centric networks, this approach
minimizes the need for trust in the infrastructure, including the
hosts providing the data, the channel, and the Name Resolution
Service (NRS) (e.g., Domain Name System (DNS)).
The contributions of this paper include analysis and dis-
cussion of the naming-related requirements and properties of
an information-centric network architecture and a proposal
of the corresponding naming scheme that consistently joins
these properties together into an overall architecture. In par-
ticular, the proposed naming scheme supports the combination
of name persistence, self-certification, owner authentication,
and owner identification all at once, going beyond existing
naming schemes for information-centric architectures. Name
persistence is ensured if storage location, content, content
owner, or owner’s organizational structure change, e.g., if
an employee changes company or a private user changes its
ISP. Self-certification allows one to verify the data integrity
without requiring trust in the storage location, for both static
and dynamic content. Owner authentication binds an IO to a
particular entity, which may be anonymous, and owner iden-
tification binds an IO to an entity with a particular physically
verifiable identity (e.g., a person or company with a given
name).
Furthermore, the NetInf naming scheme is designed for
flexibility and extensibility by supporting multiple types of
IDs. The naming scheme relies on proven mechanisms like
cryptographic hashing and public-key certificate chains to
reduce the risk of vulnerabilities. Note that the naming scheme
in DONA [1] has some similar properties, but does not allow
multiple ID types.
In Section II, the requirements for the naming scheme
are discussed. Section III describes its core functionality and
Section IV describes and analyzes its main security properties.
Relation to other work is addressed in Section V and the results
of prototype evaluation are presented in Section VI.
II. REQUIREMENTS
The main design goal is to design a naming scheme that ful-
fills the requirements of an information-centric network archi-
tecture (as discussed in detail below) and provides improved
security properties based on information-centric mechanisms
in comparison with today’s Internet.
First of all, the naming scheme has to be generic so that it
can name any kind of entity, including static and dynamic IOs,
services, network nodes, people, and real world entities like
places and objects. This requirement results from the flexible
NetInf information model that can represent many different
entity types. For the same reason and to adapt to future needs,
the naming scheme should be extensible, i.e., it should be able
to add new information (e.g., a chunk number for BitTorrent-
like protocols) to the naming scheme. The need for such exten-
sions is stressed by today’s variety of naming schemes (e.g.,
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) [5] or PermaLink) added on
top of the original Internet architecture that fulfill specialized
needs which cannot be met by the common Internet naming
schemes, i.e., IP addresses and URLs.
To enable efficient, large scale data dissemination that can
make use of any available data copy, IDs have to be location-
independent. Thereby, identical (or equivalent) data can be
identified by the same ID independently of its storage location
and improved data dissemination can then benefit from all
available copies. This should be possible without compromis-
ing trust in data regardless of its network source. Therefore,
self-certification is a main requirement. Self-certification en-
sures the integrity of data and securely binds this data to an
ID. More precisely, this property means that any unauthorized
change of data with a given ID is detectable. Beforehand,
secure retrieval of IDs (e.g., via search, embedded in a Web
page as link, etc.) is required to ensure that the user has the
right ID in the first place. Secure ID retrieval can be achieved
by using recommendations, past experience, and specialized
ID authentication services and mechanisms.
Another important requirement of the NetInf naming
scheme is name persistence, not only with respect to storage
location changes as discussed above, but also with respect to
changes of owner and/or owner’s organizational structure and
content changes producing a new version of the information.
Information should always be identifiable with the same ID
as long as it remains essentially equivalent. Spreading of
persistent naming schemes like DOI also emphasizes the need
for a persistent naming scheme. However, name persistence
and self-certification are partly contradictory and achieving
both simultaneously for dynamic content is not trivial.
From a user’s perspective, persistent IDs ensure that links
and bookmarks remain valid as long as the respective in-
formation exists somewhere in the network, reducing today’s
problem of “404 - file not found” errors triggered by renamed
or moved content. From a content provider’s perspective, name
persistence simplifies data management as content can, e.g., be
moved between folders and different servers as desired. Name
persistence with respect to content changes makes it possible
to identify different versions of the same information by the
same consistent ID. If it is important to differentiate between
multiple versions, e.g., of Wiki pages, a dedicated versioning
mechanism is required, and version numbers may or may not
be included as a special part of the ID. Doing versioning in
a distributed, collaborative fashion poses additional require-
ments, which are not addressed in this paper.
We differentiate between two mechanisms to achieve trust
and accountability in NetInf. The first is owner authenti-
cation, where the owner is recognized as the same entity,
who repeatedly acts as the object owner, but may remain
anonymous. The second is owner identification, where the
owner is also identified by a physically verifiable identifier,
such as a personal name. This separation is important to
allow for anonymous publication of content, e.g., to support
free speech, while at the same time building up trust in a
(potentially anonymous) owner.
III. NAMING SCHEME
Section III-A introduces the basic concepts of the NetInf
naming scheme, with details about the ID structure and
corresponding metadata given in Sections III-B and III-C,
respectively.
A. Basic concepts
The NetInf naming scheme is designed to securely name
a wide variety of objects and IOs including all entities
listed in the requirements section. To support this variety and
potentially diverse requirements, the NetInf naming scheme
enables flexibility and extensibility by supporting different
name structures, differentiated via the Type tag in the ID.
In the NetInf naming scheme, any entity/IO is represented
by a globally unique ID. Together with the IO’s data and
metadata, an IO is defined as IO = (ID, Data, Metadata). Data
contains the main information content of the IO. Metadata
contains information needed for the security functions of the
NetInf naming scheme, e.g., public keys, content hashes, cer-
tificates, and a data signature authenticating the content. It also
includes non-security-related information, i.e., any attributes
associated with the IO, e.g., the location where a picture was
taken. Metadata can be an integral part of the IO or can be
treated and stored independently, as a separate IO.
In an information-centric network, multiple copies of the
same IO typically exist at different locations. In contrast to
today’s Internet architecture, due to the ID/locator split, those
identical IOs have the same ID in NetInf. All IOs under the
same ID constitute an equivalence class, represented by the
common ID and need not be identical replicas of each other.
IOs are manipulated (e.g., generated, modified, registered,
and retrieved) by physical entities such as nodes (clients
or hosts), persons, and companies. Physical entities able of
generating, i.e., creating or modifying IOs are called owners.
Several security properties of our naming scheme are based
on the fact that ID contains the hash of a public key that is
part of a public/secret key pair PK/SK. This PK/SK pair is
conceptually bound to the IO itself and not directly to the
owner as in other systems like DONA. In NetInf, the PK/SK
pair can be bound to the owner only indirectly, via a certificate
chain. This is important to note because it enables owner
change while keeping persistent IDs. The key pair bound to
an IO is thus denoted as PKIO/SKIO.
Making the (hash of the) public key part of ID enables
self-certification of dynamic content while keeping persistent
IDs. Self-certification of static content can be achieved by
simply including the hash of content in the ID, but this would
obviously result in non-persistent IDs for dynamic content.
For dynamic content, the public key in the ID can be used to
securely bind the hash of content to the ID, by signing it with
the corresponding secret key, while not making it part of ID.
The owner’s PK as part of the ID inherently provides owner
authentication. If the public key is bound to the owner’s
identity (i.e., to its real-world name) via a trusted third party
certificate, this also allows owner identification. Without this
additional certificate, the owner can remain anonymous.
Sometimes, there will be a need to authenticate/identify
more than one stakeholder separately, e.g., a song that is
created by an artist but published by a record company. The
NetInf naming scheme allows authentication and identification
of multiple stakeholders for the same object by including
additional authentication data in the security metadata.
B. ID Structure
The Netinf naming scheme uses flat IDs mainly because we
want the IDs to be self-certifying and persistent. In addition,
flat IDs are advantageous when it comes to mobility and they
can be allocated without an administrative authority by relying
on statistical uniqueness in a large namespace. Although IDs
are not hierarchical, they have a specified basic ID structure,
ID = (Type, A, L), illustrated in Figure 1.
Type A=Hash(PKIO) L={attributes}
Fig. 1. Basic ID structure.
The Authenticator field A=Hash(PKIO) binds the ID to a
public key PKIO. The hash function Hash is a cryptographic
hash function, which is required to be one-way and collision-
resistant. The hash function serves only to reduce the bit length
of PKIO. PKIO is generated in accordance with a chosen
public-key cryptosystem. The corresponding secret key SKIO
should only be known to a legitimate owner. In consequence,
an owner of an IO is defined as any entity who knows SKIO
or any other secret key authorized by SKIO via a public-key
certificate chain (see Section IV-B).
The Label field L contains a number of identifier attributes
associated with an IO. These attributes can be related to the
data content and/or the owner or can be serial or random
numbers. The pair (A, L) has to be globally unique. In
particular, the identifier attributes:
• provide global uniqueness if PKIO is repeatedly used
for different IOs,
• authenticate static IOs or their static parts, by including
their hash values,
• enable partially hierarchical name resolution, if the NRS
does not treat the ID as flat, e.g., for scalability reasons.
To build a flexible and extensible naming scheme, e.g., to
adapt the naming scheme to the named entity type, different
types of IDs are supported by the NetInf naming scheme and
differentiated via a mandatory and globally standardized Type
field in each ID. The Type field specifies the hash functions
used to generate the ID. If a used hash function becomes
insecure, the Type field can be exploited by the NRS in order to
automatically mark the IDs using this hash function as invalid.
In addition, the Type field also defines the variable format and
structure of the Label L and how to interpret this structure. In
particular, the Type field specifies if the IO is static or dynamic.
C. Security Metadata Structure
The security metadata is extensible and contains all the
information required to perform the security functions embed-
ded in the NetInf naming scheme. In particular, the security
metadata includes:
• specification of the hash function h and the algorithm
DSAlg used for the digital signature,
• complete PKIO (not only Hash(PKIO)),
• public-key certificate chain authorizing the signing
PK/SK pair (see Section IV),
• specification of the parts of Data and attribute Metadata
(if not all) that are self-certified,
• for dynamic IOs, hash of the self-certified data, which,
in addition, contains the ID of IO, in order to prevent
unauthorized change of the Type and L fields,
• signature of the self-certified data signed by SKIO or
any other authorized SK,
• if needed, all the data required for owner authentication
and identification.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY PROPERTIES
The following subsections describe and analyze the main
security-related properties: self-certification, name persistence,
and owner authentication and identification.
A. Self-Certification
Self-certification relates to all data or just parts of the IO, as
specified in the security metadata. If h and DSAlg are secure,
then the only feasible way of performing unauthorized changes
to the self-certified data is by changing the IO’s ID.
Self-certification of static IOs, whose content does not
change in time, can be achieved by including the hash of the
self-certified data in the L field of the ID. Verification of the
data is then performed by computing the hash value of the
retrieved data and comparing it with the one from the ID.
More generally, the same holds for any invariant, static parts
of the data, whose hash values can be included in the L field
of the ID. The advantage of this approach is that there is no
need to resort to the metadata in order to verify the content.
For dynamic IOs, the hash of (variable) data cannot be
included in the ID as it would violate name persistence. Self-
certification is then achieved by storing the signed hash of
the self-certified data in the metadata, where the signature is
performed by a legitimate owner using SKIO or any other SK
authorized by SKIO. Verification of the data then consists of
first verifying if the PK used for signing is equal to PKIO (by
comparing the hash values) or is authorized by a valid public-
key certificate chain originating in PKIO/SKIO and then
verifying the signature of the self-certified data. This ensures a
secure binding between the self-certified data and the ID. Only
the legitimate owners can produce the valid signature and any
change to the self-certified data performed by other entities
can be detected. If an unauthorized PK/SK pair is used for
signing, to produce a new signature for potentially modified
data, the ID will change.
B. Name Persistence
The NetInf naming scheme can ensure persistent IDs in spite
of changes of the storage location, the content itself, the owner
of a data item, as well as owner’s organizational changes.
Independence of organizational changes is an inherent
feature of the NetInf naming scheme as IDs, especially the
Authenticator field, are flat and do not reflect organizational
structures as in other approaches, e.g., CCN.
Location independence results from the ID/locator split
that the naming scheme builds upon. The NetInf IDs are
dynamically bound to one or multiple network locators, where
copies of the IO are stored. Hence, when a locator changes, the
ID remains persistent and only the binding has to be adapted,
which is managed outside the naming scheme by a NRS.
Content independence for static content can be achieved
by storing the content’s hash in the ID as described in
Section IV-A. For dynamic content, content independence is
achieved by storing the signed content’s hash in the associated
metadata instead of the ID.
Owner independence can be achieved in two ways, by the
less complex basic approach and the advanced approach,
which is more secure, but also more complex. The owners
can choose the approach more appropriate to their needs.
The basic approach is based on the fact that PKIO
contained in the ID is bound to the IO itself, and not
to a specific owner. Therefore, when the owner changes,
the corresponding SKIO can be securely passed on to the
new owner, who will then use the same PKIO/SKIO pair.
Thereby, the PKIO/SKIO pair is not changed and the ID
remains persistent. This approach is simple, but requires a
secure (confidential and authenticated) channel for passing on
the SKIO. A disadvantage of this approach is that it is not
robust with respect to disclosure of the secret key.
In the advanced approach, each new owner can use a new
key pair PK/SK for self-certification and, possibly, also a new
hash function h and signing algorithm DSAlg. This eliminates
the need for securely transferring the secret key and ensures a
certain level of robustness with respect to secret key disclosure.
To keep the ID persistent, the hash of the original PKIO in
the ID remains unchanged. However, the metadata is signed by
the secret key of the latest new owner, SKlatest, and verified
by the corresponding public key, PKlatest.
The PKlatest/SKlatest pair used for signing needs to be
securely bound to the ID. This is achieved by using a public-
key certificate chain authorizing the PKlatest/SKlatest pair
by the original PKIO/SKIO pair. The public-key certificate
chain provides a secure binding between PKIO and PKlatest
and, hence, also between PKIO and SKlatest. Each particular
public-key certificate includes the PK of the former owner and
the new PK of the new owner. It also contains the IO’s ID to
bind the authorizations to this ID. The specification of new
h and DSAlg’ is also included in the public-key certificate if
those have changed. The certificate is signed by the SK of the
former owner. To ensure validity of the digital signature, the
whole certificate chain, stored in the IO’s metadata, needs to
be verified, by verifying each certificate along the chain.
Both the approaches technically allow all legitimate owners
in the certificate chain to make valid changes to the IO. If this
behavior is undesired and former owners should be prevented
from making changes to the IO, then the advanced approach
facilitates prohibition on a legal basis, by including the produc-
tion and expiry times in each authorization certificate and by
providing a trusted time certification service to the involved
owners (e.g., by the NRS during registration/unregistration).
Otherwise, a key revocation mechanism can be used for this
purpose. The same mechanism can also be used to handle key
renovation and revocation of compromised secret keys. Details
about this are out of the scope of this paper.
C. Owner Authentication and Identification
A distinctive feature of the NetInf naming framework is that
owner authentication is separated from data self-certification.
This means that the PK/SK pair used for owner authentication
(PKowner/SKowner) is allowed to be different from the one
used for data self-certification of an IO (PK ′
IO
/SK ′
IO
), which
itself is equal to PKIO/SKIO or is authorized by it.
Owner authentication essentially binds the IO’s self-
certified content to PKowner. It can be achieved by including
Hash(PKowner) in self-certified data and by signing this data
both by SK ′
IO
and by SKowner (if SKowner 6= SK ′IO). The
signatures are included in the associated security metadata.
Owner authentication is then performed by verifying the
signatures.
Owner authentication allows the owner to remain anony-
mous. Nevertheless, by reusing the same PKowner for several
IOs, the owner can build up trust in this PKowner and,
thereby, in the content itself on the basis of the quality and
trustworthiness of the previously published content. Thereby,
PKowner becomes a kind of virtual identity of the owner,
comparable to, e.g., an eBay user name that has a certain level
of trust based on its history of transactions.
Owner identification essentially binds the IO’s self-certified
content not only to to PKowner, but also to the corresponding
real world identity of the owner, e.g., the name of a person
or a company. It can be achieved by including the real world
identity in self-certified data and by signing this data in the
same way as for owner authentication. In addition, the real
world identity needs to be verified, and this can be achieved
by an additional signature binding PKowner to this identity,
i.e., the public-key certificate. This certificate is issued by a
trusted third party upon verifying that the physical entity with
this identity knows SKowner and is included in the security
metadata. Owner identification is then performed by verifying
all the signatures.
V. RELATED WORK
The basic idea that an ID contains an ‘object owner’-related
part (hash of public key) that can be used for authentication
and a ‘label’ part that is under the control of ‘the owner’
has been suggested in previous work, which includes Simple
Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [6] and DONA [1].
However, SDSI and DONA bind the public key directly to an
entity called principal. Therefore, when the principal changes,
the ID also changes both in SDSI and DONA, breaking the
name persistence. In our naming scheme, we can keep the ID
persistent even when the owner changes because the public key
is bound to the IO itself and only indirectly to the owner. As
a consequence, NetInf also supports anonymous publications,
which is difficult to achieve if the public key is directly bound
to the owner. Moreover, in DONA, “... only hosts authorized
by the principal P can offer to serve (i.e., provide access
to) entities with IDs of the form P:L” [1], which limits the
usability of available copies. In contrast, it is an important
feature in NetInf to make use of any available data copy to
improve efficient data dissemination.
The naming approaches of NetInf and CCN [4] differ
essentially, because CCN uses hierarchical names typically
corresponding to organizational structures. This implies that
the name persistence with respect to owner or organizational
changes is not satisfied. The CCN security concept requires
that the IO’s ID and the content be signed by an entity trusted
by the users. If this entity is bound to the IO’s ID (e.g., the
owner or any part of organizational structure), then the trust
changes if the owner or organizational structure change. If
not, then the trust becomes difficult to control. If this entity is
different from the owner, then signing of dynamic content may
be a problem. Since the signing public keys are placed outside
the ID, CCN IDs do not inherently support self-authenticated
name registration and users cannot specify the trusted public
keys beforehand when indicating an interest in data and can,
thus, be overwhelmed by fake data packets with the ‘right’ ID,
which cannot be filtered on the basis of their ID. This makes
the system vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
Another closely related initiative is PSIRP [3]. Their main
idea is to implement a pure publish/subscribe information-
centric system. They use rendezvous IDs to retrieve IOs. In
addition, they have scope IDs to restrict the distribution of
objects. However, to our best knowledge, PSIRP currently
only focuses on self-certification via the IDs but not on owner
authentication, identification, and other security properties
supported by the NetInf naming scheme.
For the special case of static content, NetInf can include
the cryptographic hash of the underlying information in the
ID itself. A similar idea has been proposed, e.g, in SFS [7],
however, for self-certifying pathnames that are location depen-
dent. Likewise, the idea of certificate chains (although, in a
different context) has been used in other proposals like Simple
Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) [8] and KeyNote [9].
The Handle System [10] offers a general mechanism to
persistently identify digital objects and builds the basis for
other systems like DOI [5]. However, the Handle system does
not include security mechanisms like self-certification and
owner authentication in the naming scheme itself, which are
required for an information-centric network architecture. In
addition, the NetInf naming scheme differs from many of the
above mentioned systems because of its flexibility to support
various different ID structures via its ID type tag.
During recent years, it has become apparent that many of the
problems that are haunting the Internet stem from the semantic
overloading of the IP address. A lot of effort has been put into
investigating how an ID/locator split can be instrumental in
providing better support for mobility, multihoming, protection
against DoS attacks, etc. Important work in this area includes
the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [11], the Internet Indirection
Infrastructure (I3) [12], the NodeID architecture [13], and the
Layered Naming Architecture [14]. Our naming scheme is also
based on an ID/locator split, but has different properties as our
focus is on supporting efficient data dissemination while at the
same time satisfying the requirements of a secure information-
centric network architecture.
In the Layered Naming Architecture, the authors state four
principles which stress that names should not impose unnec-
essary restrictions by how they bind to underlying protocols
or provide name persistence. To cater for these requirements
and allow maximal flexibility, we use flat IDs which allow
arbitrary recursions and indirections as they are allowed to
map onto themselves before they finally resolve to a locator.
Flat IDs are instrumental for the NetInf naming scheme to
provide several security properties. Scalable name resolution
for large flat namespaces is a challenge. While not being the
focus of this paper, the MDHT and LLC architectures [15] give
an overview of how this problem is addressed within NetInf.
There are several systems that build their own mechanisms
to check data integrity based on cryptographic hashes, in-
cluding open source software package distribution and the
BitTorrent protocol. Such systems can benefit from the NetInf
naming scheme, eliminating the need to build their own
mechanisms while providing additional security properties.
VI. EVALUATION
We have built a Java-based NetInf prototype [16] to evaluate
and show the feasibility of the NetInf naming scheme, cur-
rently working on FreeBSD, Linux, Windows, and Android.
The naming scheme has proven to be easy to implement
as it is based on several established security mechanisms
like encryption and digital signatures that can be integrated
via existing, proven libraries. Likewise, it is also easy to
integrate and use the naming scheme in applications. We
have built applications from scratch and have extended ex-
isting applications (an email client (Thunderbird) and a Web
browser (Firefox)) with additional security functionality based
on simple plugins. For example, our Firefox plugin enables the
browser to interpret Web pages that contain NetInf IDs instead
of regular URLs as links. Thereby, users and content publisher
can benefit from all NetInf naming scheme advantages right
away by simply using the plugin on the client side and
using NetInf IDs instead of (or in addition to, for backward
compatibility) URLs as links in Web pages. For example, the
plugin gives users an additional icon indicating if the currently
received Web page is authentic or has been (maliciously)
altered. Publishers, in addition, benefit from more flexible
content management thanks to the persistent IDs. More details
about the prototype are described in Dannewitz et al. [16]. In
general, the naming scheme has demonstrated to improve the
security properties of a wide variety of applications ranging
from information dissemination and information management
to advanced context-aware mobile applications [17].
The generality of the naming scheme allows for several
additional use cases. For example, the security features in-
herent to the NetInf naming scheme enable a secured, self-
authenticated name registration process of IOs by owners in
the NRS, which prevents (replay) DoS attacks on the under-
lying registration servers that simply replay the transcripts of
previous registrations. In order to register/unregister an IO, an
owner needs to provide a (fresh) signature of the IO’s ID and
the registration time, where the signature is verified by using
PKIO from the ID. Signing the registration time prevents the
replay DoS attacks.
The load and overhead produced by the naming scheme on
a client/server node has proven not to be an issue. In fact,
we have an implementation of the naming scheme smoothly
running on Android cell phones. The overall prototype will be
published as open source project shortly.
VII. CONCLUSION
Information-centric network architectures have an inherent
need for a secure naming scheme. Because requested data can
be delivered from any available untrusted network location that
happens to have a copy of the data, security has to be based
on the data and its ID itself and cannot be based on network
nodes. There are some existing proposals for information-
centric network architectures, including corresponding naming
schemes. However, it seems that they are all missing some
properties that we think are important.
Having this in mind, we started by investigating what prop-
erties are essential for an information-centric naming scheme.
Based on this analysis, we have developed the NetInf naming
scheme. It can simultaneously fulfill all our requirements
based on the combination of a flexible ID structure and a
securely attached set of metadata. In addition to security
properties like self-certification and owner authentication also
provided by some other naming schemes, the NetInf naming
scheme is characterized by its unique, non-trivial combination
of security-related properties. This includes the flexibility to
name a wide variety of entities, extensibility, persistent IDs
under various changing conditions (especially owner change),
self-authenticated name registration, and support for anony-
mous publication of information.
Our prototype evaluation shows that our naming scheme
is feasible and provides a powerful foundation for a secure
information-centric network architecture. In the future, we will
extend the naming scheme to support features like advanced
version tracking and information-centric access control.
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